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Abstract: 
Contacts and the way they are organized in different economic systems matter for 
the economy. In this paper we introduce the notion of Relational Capital to model 
contacts. Contacts are an input into sold output in our macro model based on 
matching theory (Pissarides, 1990).  
We argue that the destruction of some contacts in search for better ones is an 
integral part of technological advancement. This destruction carries a negative 
externality on former business partners. 
Socialist economies restricted such creative destruction, which we argue lead to 
their increasing technological backwardness. This is our explanation of the output 
fall during (unrestricted) transition: the technological catch-up implied high levels 
of destroyed and replaced relational capital. This not only had high direct 
opportunity costs (more labor is used for the production of relational capital) but 
also led to a loss in overall relational capital. The basic model is used to simulate 
plausible transition paths which appear compatible with many stylized facts of the 
transition experience. Finally we discuss empirical observations as well as policy 
issues brought up in the literature. 
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Contacts and the way they areorganizedindi¤erenteconomicsystemsmatter
for the economy. In this paper we introduce the notion of Relational Capital
to model contacts. Contacts are an input into sold output in our macro
model based on matching theory (Pissarides, 1990).
We argue that the destruction of some contacts in search for better ones
is an integral part of technological advancement. This destruction carries a
negative externality on former business partners.
Socialist economies restricted such creative destruction, which we argue
lead to their increasing technological backwardness. This is our explanation
of the output fall during (unrestricted) transition: the technological catch-up
impliedhigh levels of destroyed and replacedrelational capital. This not only
had high direct opportunity costs (more labor is used for the production of
relational capital) but also led to a loss in overall relational capital.
The basic model is used to simulate plausible transition paths which ap-
pear compatible withmany stylizedfacts of the transitionexperience. Finally
we discuss empirical observations as well as policy issues brought up in the
literature.
Keywords: Transition, Economic Systems, Relations, Innovation
JEL: P21, P51, O33The carrying out of new combinations we call ‘enterprise’.
Joseph Schumpeter (1934:74)
1 Introduction
One of the most far-reaching economic developments of our time is the tran-
sition in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, of social-
ism to capitalism. The major surprise was that those countries with arguably
most to gainfrom the transition- those withlowest initial GDP- experienced
the worst GDP falls of a magnitude ‘never before experienced in the history
of capitalist economies’ (Mundell, 1997).
The questions we address are what characterized and caused economic
circumstances before transition1; how the output fall is related to the nature
of the transition from capitalism to socialism; and whether such an output
fall can be avoided in ongoing and future transitions?
Our paper is inspired by Blanchard and Kremer’s (1997) and Roland
and Verdier’s (1999) disorganization theory. These authors argue that the
output fall was caused by the negative externality of …rms breaking o¤ pre-
vious contacts with other …rms replacing them with more productive part-
ners. However, in these articles there are no labor costs of making contacts,
technological gains from destroying contacts are an one-o¤ event, and the
opportunities for gains arrive exogenously. Our model formalizes the role of
contacts, introduces labor costs of making and replacing contacts, conceptu-
alizes technological growth and the role of contacts in a continuous process,
and draws in the socialist experience. Doing so, we endogenize the origin of
the potential technological gain at the start of transition and draw implica-
tions of the transition beyond a one-o¤ event.
1The key stylised fact about socialist countries to be explained is that they did well
when they were ‘young’ but showed from the eighties onwards a disappointing performance
in terms of output.
1The key element in our story is the role of what we call ‘relational cap-
ital’ (RC) in sold production and technological progress.2 RC is the stock
of business relations and contacts necessary to procure inputs and to sell
output.3
On the one hand, RC is a direct input into the production of sold output.
To sell outputs and buy inputs, contacts with suitable trading partners need
to be found and maintained whenever markets are less than perfect. This
is typically a white collar job that complements physical production. Both,
a market economy and a planned economy need RC to function, economic
systems di¤er in who decides about what links are formed and severed.
On the other hand, innovations need the destruction and replacement
of some relations. An improved product needs new suppliers to make and
new customers to buy it. Economies of scale to specialization make it inef-
…cient for an individual …rm to continue making the old product alongside
the new one. We name the destruction of old contacts and old ways of or-
ganizations in order to …nd better technologies ‘creative destruction’, in line
with Schumpeter’s view that invention and innovation is crucial to economic
advancement.4 This creative destruction comprises of many small advances
made by large numbers of …rms, involving negative externalities on the RC
of other …rms.
The socialist and capitalist system di¤er in the extent to which they
2In the social capital literature (see for example Sobel, 2002) one distinguishes between
an individual and communal aspect of social capital. Our concept relates to the individual
aspect. See Frijters et al. (2003) for a discussion of the relation between RC and social
capital. To avoid confusion, our concept of relational capital is unrelated to the ‘relational
theory of contract law’ (see for example Macauly, 1963, or Williamson, 1985) which dis-
cusses certain aspect of communal level social capital, namely norms and laws and how
they a¤ect economic development.
3Frijters(2000) introduces a related concept of relational capital on the …rm level and
analyses the consequences for the wage and age structure of employees within a …rm.
4Our notion of creative destruction is not related to the neo-Schumpeterian literature
because we do not explicitly model monopoly rents. Given that we focus mostly on small
advancements, our use of the term best …ts Schumpeter Mark I technologies.
2allow creative destruction. Destruction of relations was almost impossible
under socialism: …rms were simply not allowed to change trading partners
(Braguinsky and Yavlinsky, 2000). This implied a large technological gap at
the start of the transition, giving …rms strong incentives to engage increative
destruction. The negative externalitiesof excessive creativedestruction is our
‘disorganization’ explanation for the initial output collapse. An additional
output-decreasing e¤ect of massive creative destruction in our model is the
large-scale re-allocationof labor towards …nding new contacts and away from
physical production during transition.
A real-life example of our arguments on RC is provided in Meyer’s (2000)
analysis of the automotive industry in Central Europe. Prior to 1989, nine
independent manufacturers in Central Europe (among them Wartburg and
Trabant in East Germany, Skoda in Czechoslovakia and Dacia in Romania)
were producing some 3.2 million cars annually, primarily for the CoMEcon
(Council for Mutual EconomicAssistance) market. Soonafter1989, all major
producers of passenger cars in Central Europe formed joint-ventures with, or
were takenover by, Westernpartners. The most successful one was the Czech
car manufacturer Skoda, which was taken over by the VW Group. While
the change in ownership brought an increase in FDI in Skoda, the main
bene…ts of the change came through new business links. Skoda pressured
its local partners to link up with Western partners, while VW urged its
global suppliers to form joint-ventures with, or acquire local Czech …rms.
About 50 multinational automotive suppliers did so, among them the British
Lucas Group (providing brake systems) and Rockwell (sun roofs), and the
German Siemens/Sommer-Allibert (cockpits). The Skoda-VW deal brings
out the contrast between those local enterprises whobene…ttedfrom this new
Relational Capital and those who didn’t. As Meyer (2000:141) notes, ‘great
opportunities emerged for local suppliers to become global suppliers through
the VW group’, but ‘(o)ther Czech suppliers who did not succeed in securing
contracts ... struggled for survival ...’. This case of RC replacement yielded
gains for newSkoda-VW suppliers and losses for those Czech suppliers losing
3their ‘old’ RC.
The organization of this article is as follows. In Section 2, the literature
on the output fall is reviewed. Section 3 contains a general equilibrium
growth model of RC, creative destruction, socialism and capitalism. Section
4 presents a series of simulations. We simulate ‘typical’ growth paths of
socialism and transition, and then explore robustness and optimal transition
design. In Section 5, the …ndings are related to the stylized facts of transition
and to policy questions. Section 6 discusses extensions. Appendix 1 provides
micro arguments for the main aspects of the model and Appendix 2 contains
steady state properties.
2 Literature on the Output Fall
Figure 1 depicts the fall and recovery of output in the Central and Eastern
European Economies and in the former Soviet Republics. Developments
in GDP are presented as regional aggregates, but the pattern of a drop in
GDP followed by recovery is observable in each of the 25 transition countries
represented in Figure 1 (see EBRD, 2002).





































Notes: data for 2001 are preliminary, mostly o¢cial government, estimates.
Data for 2002 represent EBRD projections. Source: EBRD (2002:17)
These …gures are not uncontested: the method of measuring the size of
the economy changed from Net Material Product to Gross Domestic Prod-
uct, and from administrative to market prices; the accuracy of these mea-
sures may have been limited during this period; and not all of the decline in
physical output represented a decline in welfare, as part of socialist produc-
tion was characterized by negative value-added at market prices (Gaddy and
Ickes 2002). However, studies with alternative measures than GDP, using
consumption rather than production data, con…rm that the fall in output
amounted to a true collapse (Gavrilenkov and Koen, 1995).
Campos and Coricelli (2002) review the many, often country-speci…c, fac-
tors that may have contributed to the output fall discussed in the literature.
One factor is institutional di¢culty in setting up new enterprises and ef-
fectively privatizing old ones (Swaan and Lissowska, 1992; Lieberman and
Nellis, 1995; Bornstein, 1999). Another factor is the fall in demand due to
monetary stabilization policies (Rosati, 1994). Blanchard (1997) …nds these
factors insu¢cient as a general explanation, arguing that many countries
were not institutionally constrained and many sectors were little a¤ected by
5monetary policies.
Another explanation is that the output fall was due to new opportunities
in di¤erent sectors, which involved large-scale capital depreciation and large-
scale labour re-allocation. Campos and Coricelli (2002) however point out
that returns to capital actually fell, that foreign investment was low, that ’old
…rms’ accounted for much of new growth, and that there was little labour re-
allocation between sectors. Campos and Coricelli (2002) hence dismiss this
sectoral re-allocation explanation, for which they also use the term creative
destruction. In contrast, we use the term creative destruction for processes
that mainly occur within sectors and …rms.
Finally, several authors have blamed the output fall mainly on ‘disorga-
nization’ (Schmieding 1993; Kornai 1994; Blanchard 1997; Blanchard and
Kremer 1997; Roland and Verdier 1999). These authors note the large-
scale breakdown in contacts between organizations, their suppliers and their
clients. Reasons given for this breakdown not only include the ‘endogenous’
break-ups by individual …rms (Blanchard 1997) triggered by the exogenous
arrival of more pro…table opportunities, but also the breaking up of trade
blocks and the dismantling of the control apparatus. In contrast to our
model, the disorganization literature has ignored labor costs of making con-
tacts. It has also implicitly assumed that the transition markets are less
‘developed’ (i.e. thinner) than capitalist markets, which means these mod-
els become invalid if …rms were allowed to tap into developed markets via
foreign partners. Our model makes no such ‘developed market’ distinction
and is hence robust to the observation that foreign enterprises formed a rich
source of partner …rms in the actual transition.
3 A Model of the Real Economy
3.1 Introducing Relational Capital
We introduce Relational Capital (RCt) as an input in sold output yt of
a representative …rm. Relational capital represents the stock of business
6contacts and the network of the …rm. As the New Institutional Economics
literature (see for example Williamson and Masten, 1999) argues, business
contacts are needed to buy inputs and sell outputs. Also, the more business
contacts a …rm has, the more it can specialize in what it is good at and hence
reap economies of scale, i.e. outsource what it is not good at. We take the
following production function:
yt = y(A;Lt ¡ L
rc
t ;RCt;Kt) (1)
where yt is sold production at time t; Lt is the labor force, Lt¡Lrc
t is net
labor input into physical production (blue collar labor); Lrc
t is (white collar)
labor devoted to the creation of RCt; At is the technology parameter; Kt
is physical capital. y(:) is a constant-returns-to-scale function with all the
usual Inada-properties: any input faces decreasing positive marginal returns
and is technically complementary to any other input.
The economy has a continuum of such …rms with a measure of 1. This
allows us to use ¹ yt; Lt; Kt; and RCt as the total amount of output, labor
andcapital stocks in the whole economy. Similar to standard macroeconomic
growth models we assume the following functional form for our analysis
yt = y(Atf(Lt ¡ Lrc
t ;RCt);Kt) (2)
where Atf(Lt¡Lrc
t ;RCt) is a single composite input: technology At is the
productivity of the combination of labor and contacts, similar to labor aug-
mented (or Harrod-neutral) technology. Assumptions on f(:) are implicitly
given by the assumptions on y(:).
The replacement value of business contacts lies in the heterogeneity of
trading parties: parties cannot easily …nd other suppliers and clients once a
relation is discontinued, because they can only buy their inputs from speci…c
groups and sell their output to other speci…c groups. Finding contacts incurs
transaction costs for information search and sharing, bargaining, and de…n-
ing property rights (North, 1990). Underlying heterogeneity is basic to all
models with search frictions, although usually not modelled explicitly (e.g.
Pissarides, 1990).
7Contacts between …rms change dynamically. We distinguish between Drc
t ;
the amount of relational capital replaced (destroyed), and Nrc
t ; the amount
of extra (new) relational capital built up. Because of search frictions, it takes





where ‚t denotes the conversion rate of (white collar) labor Lrc
t into rela-
tions. It canbe interpreted as the arrival rate of contacts. The circumstances
that a¤ect contact rates in search theory (e.g. Pissarides, 1990) would seem
to carry over to ‚ : smaller geographic or cultural distances increase ‚; the
more complex and speci…c production, the lower ‚:
Drc
t has di¤erent economy-wide implications than Nrc
t . Replacing old
contacts carries an externality since it implies destroying old relationships.
While the amount of own RC remains constant for the …rm doing the replac-
ing, the former trading partner’s RCt diminishes and hence also the total












RCt¡1 equals the probability of an old contact being
destroyed by the creative destruction decisions of other …rms. In appendix
1 we derive this probability, based on a simple stochastic process of contact
destruction on the micro level. The parameter ﬂ equals the net number of
contacts that get destroyed when one …rm replaces an old contact. When a
…rm is part of a large chain of …rms whose production depended on this …rm,
ﬂ will be large. This applies when the chain of forward or backward linkages
is long. If production is only pair wise, chains have the minimal length of 2
…rms or workers and ﬂ will take its minimal value of 1.
Our argument is that …rms replace relations to improve their technol-
ogy At. Technological progress involves changing the production process.
This involves new clients and new suppliers. Adopting new technologies or
new market partners therefore renders some of the previous contacts obso-
8lete. These have to be replaced. We name this replacement of RC creative
destruction and model technological progress as








t denotes the production frontier at time t and 1 > g(:) ¸ 0
denotes technological ‘catch-up’ resulting from the replacement of relational
capital per unit of Lt. The lag between Drc
t and At re‡ects the fact that it
takes time to adapt to new technology. We assume that there are decreasing
returns in technological investment:
@g(:)
@Drc




The example below graphically illustrates the di¤erent e¤ects of Drc
t and
Nrc
t on the total level of RCt:
Example 1: Creative destruction and network expansion
In Example 1, there are 4 entities such as enterprises, or workers within
9an organization. Initially, there are productive contacts between entity 1
and 2, and between entity 3 and 4. The top example shows what happens
with creative destruction: entity 1 and 3 form a new productive contact
and simultaneously change their production process leading both to abandon
the contact they previously had with other entities. The net e¤ect of this
creative destruction is thereby a loss of one contact (ﬂ = 1). The bottom
example shows what happens with making extra contacts: without changing
production processes, both entity 1 and 3 try to increase their amount of
contacts. The new contact between these entities does not force either of
them to abandon their previous contacts. The net e¤ect is an increase in the
number of contacts by one.
We can extend this example to situations where ﬂ is larger: if some of
these entities are part of a whole chain of contacts (ﬂ > 1), the whole chain
suddenly becomes worthless when a single entity in the chain pulls out. In
Appendix 1 we present a micro-economic model in which equations (1) to
(4) arise from search arguments and …rm-level processes.
To close our model, we make assumptions about the movement of total
labor units, the technological frontier and physical capital formation:
Lt = L
Kt = (1 ¡ –)Kt¡1 + syt¡1
A¤
t = (1 +a)A¤
t¡1
Labor is constant; capitalfollows theSwan-Solow-assumptions of…xedde-
preciation and constant savings rate; the technological frontier increases with
a …xed percentage over time, again the standard Swan-Solow-assumption.
These assumptions imply we do not analyze endogenous savings behavior or
the development of the technological frontier. We did endogenize savings in
earlier versions of the paper, but found them to be irrelevant: even saving
rates of 0 percent would not, in our simulations, lead to more than a fraction
of the 50% output fall in 5 years. Empirically also, saving rates have been
10found to be unimportant. Indeed, they were unexpectedly high during the
transition (see Gros and Steinherr, 1995). Because the technological fron-
tier is largely related to technological advancements in the whole world, it
does not appear restrictive to treat its dynamics as given for the transition
countries.
3.2 The di¤erence between capitalism and socialism
The variable via which we distinguish economic systems is Drc
t . Whilst no in-
stitution constrains Drc
t under capitalism, there are several reasons why Drc
t
was small in the socialist system. The simplest reason is that economic coor-
dinationin thesocialist systemwas based on enforcement of business contacts
and hence ruled out or hindered the unilateral destruction of old contacts by
individual …rms. It is furthermore in the interest of each individual …rm to
prevent creative destruction in other …rms because of the externality. Firms
lobby the center to prevent their suppliers and clients from breaking up with
them. Suchlobbying indeedseems tohave been prevalent insocialist systems
(e.g. Braguinsky and Yavlinsky, 2000; Nove 1987): in the old Soviet Union,
there was a system known as ‘tolkachi’ where …rms sent envoys to prevent
other …rms severing ties with them.5
Asecond reason for lowDrc
t under socialism is that technological progress
consists of very many small advances. The ‘span of control’ of the socialist
center is not large enough to mimic this, i.e. it is not logistically possible
to collect and digest the amount of information necessary to recognize each
small possible advance at the micro-level.
A…nal reasonis that technological progress occurs at the level of the indi-
vidual …rm, which means that …rms will invest in technological progress only
if they have technological property rights. Without technological property
rights, no …rm individually engages in creative destruction because it would
5We interpret the resources spent on lobbying as of the low technology variety in our
model. An alternative (to be explored in future work) is to introduce and endogenise a
‘cost of keeping contacts’.
11contribute to a public good with little private returns.
Tocapture the distinctionbetweensocialism and capitalism inour model,
we assume that under socialism Drc
t = 0: This simplifying assumption am-
pli…es the e¤ect of lower replacement of contacts under socialism. The main
point is that any restriction on contact replacement in our argument leads
to a less technological progress under socialism.
This endogenous lack of technological progress has been noted by the
literature on command economies (e.g. Gros and Steinherr, 1995; Aslund,
2002). Especially inside organizations, production was ine¢cient because
managers hadnoincentiveto improve technology by breaking upcontacts. In
the words of Braguinsky and Yavlinsky (2000:31): ‘ ... the totalitarian state
(and the SOE manager, as its agent) used to run into almost insurmountable
di¢culties to …re just one single drunkard. [...]. It was by no means a pre-
determined result which of the two would end up in a labor camp - the lazy
drunkard or the o¢cial for an alleged “alienation from the working class”’.
3.3 Firm Behavior in Transition
We make the standard assumption (e.g. Roberts and Rodriguez 1997) that
under socialism, the central planner maximizes the discounted stream of
average output equal to
P1
t=0(1¡ ‰)t¹ yt.
Under capitalism, …rms are assumed to maximize the discounted stream
of pro…ts6 equal to
P1
t=0(1¡‰)tfyt¡wtL¡rtKtg with ‰ > ﬁ: The di¤erence
in socialism and capitalism we allow for is not the absence of maximizing
behavior, but constraints on Drc
t .
The steady-state equilibrium of the model is derived by standard endoge-
nous growth arguments. In the steady state under socialism, there is no
technological progress and hence all long run stocks are stationary and there
is no investment in extra relational capital. The level of RC is solely de-
termined by the opportunity costs of labor. Socialist countries with higher
6One can equivalently think of discounted consumption maximising consumers to be
the recipients of wages, capital rents, and pro…ts.
12initial levels of technology do better in the long run. Under capitalism, there
is perpetual creative destruction and investment in new relations to com-
pensate for the losses of RC due to creative destruction. Hence the long-run
gap between capitalism and socialism grows at the same rate as technological
progress.7 Because in this paper we are interested in transition paths and not
in steady-states, we relegate a brief discussion on how to …nd steady states
to Appendix 2.
At the beginning oftransition…rms face givenstocks of RC. They behave
like the …rm in the capitalist system. We restrict ourselves to symmetric
transition paths. This means L is going to be constant for each …rm over
time. We can then write the maximization problem at the beginning of
















Kt ¸ 0;L¡ L
rc
t ¸ 0;

















Given basic economic reasoning we know that the latter three conditions
will be binding andthe non-negativity constraints on Kt andproductivelabor
(L ¡ Lrc
t ) are non-binding. Nrc
t and Drc
t may be 0 or positive depending on
the stocks in the economy. The …rst-order conditions for an interior Drc
t and
7In Frijters et al. (2003) we analyze and discuss a case where contact rates for Drc are
lower than for N rc based on di¤erences between economic systems.
13Nrc

































We are interested in a rational expectations equilibrium. The conditions
for suchan equilibrium arethat ¹ Drc
t = Drc
t andRCt¡1 = RCt¡1: The problem
is bounded by the assumption that
1
1+r > ﬁ: The existence of a rational
expectation equilibrium is guaranteed by the smoothness assumptions on yt:
To generate numerical solutions we follow standard procedures: we solve for
the steady state, presume theeconomy to hit the steady state at some date in
the far future andthen solve backwards for all prior transitiondecisions. The
only ‘special’ di¢culty is that the many multipliers force us to simultaneously
solve for all transition choices at once.
4 Simulations: Socialism and the Transition
to Capitalism
















which presumes a standard Cobb-Douglas productionfunctionand a sim-
ple catch-up process for technological progress. Our dynamic assumptions
are that at t0; socialism starts with initial conditions A¤
0; A0; K0; RC0; L:
During socialism Dt = 0: After Ts periods, socialism collapses and the tran-
sition starts. After time t0 + Ts; Dt is unconstrained. We take: ￿0 = 0:65;
14￿ = 0:7; – = 0:1, g0 = 0:2; g1 = 0:8; Ts = 60; ‚(:) = 1; ‰ = 0:06; s = 0:3;
ﬂ = 5, and ﬁ = 0:02:
These parameter assumptions are selected to re‡ect reality in various
ways. First, they imply that physical capital accounts for 30% of output,
production labor 45% and RC 25%. This measure of the importance of
RC is conservative. In a pioneering study, Machlup (1962) estimated the
share of all economic activity in the United Sates devoted to discovering
and distributing information at 29 %. Porat (1977) puts it close to 50 %.
Second, values for ‚ and g0 are su¢ciently high for the transition economy
to be able to catch up with the technological frontier within two decades.
Third, parameter values re‡ect standard assumptions about discount rates
(6% a year), saving rates (30% a year), and technological progress (2% a
year). Some arbitrariness remains, to which we will return later.
4.1 The Socialist Expansion
We …rst comment on the dynamics of early socialism. The parameter values
at the starting point for socialism are selected so as to …t the USSR in the
1920’s. It was thenthelargest peasantnationin the worldrecoveringfrom the
…rst World War: up-to-date technology and an abundance of labor, but only
minimal levels of capital and RC: This is re‡ected in A¤
0 = 0:2, A0 = 0:15;
L = 1; and K0 = RC0 = 0:5: Figures 2a and 2b show a simulation of the
development of the economy after the start of socialism. Figure 2c shows the
development of the technological frontier and the development of technology
under socialism and capitalism.
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Figure 2c: technological development after WW I
0
1






































In this simulation we have assumed a discounted-output maximizing so-
cial planner.8 Economic growth is very high in the …rst few years, i.e. about
8The results are the same if we assume that individual socialist …rms with rational
1612% a year. This level drops to about 4% per year after a decade, further
dropping to about 1% a year after 3 decades, and then gradually tails o¤ to
zero. This pattern is in line with the impressive performance of the Soviet
economy during industrialization in the late 1920s and 1930s (the …rst 5-year
plans), and its weak growth record during late socialism (Harrison, 2000;
Easterley and Fischer, 1995). The main thing our model does not …t is the
Soviet growth decline in the 40’s and its high growth in the 50’s, which were
intimately connected to the capital and labour destruction during the second
world war.
The reasons for the initial growth is the high level of Nrc
t (growth rate
of RC) and the growth in the stock of physical capital. Eventually however,
the economy slows down as the value of more contacts diminishes. The lack
of creative destruction then leads to zero long term growth rates. As shown
in Figure 2c, the technological gap between capitalism and communism is
ever increasing in this period. One can relax this assumption such that there
are incentives in some sectors for technological advancement but not in other
sectors. One would then obtain a steady state in which there is growth in
some sectors (for instance the military sector), but not in others. In fact,
there is evidence that Soviet growth was simultaneously negative in some
sectors and positive in others (Aslund, 2002):
4.2 The Transition
We nowturn to the transition, where we assume …rms maximize discounted-
pro…ts and have rational expectations.9
expectations maximised pro…t given Drc
t = 0: This is because without creative destruction,
there are no externalities in the model.
9Myopia can be argued to be a more reasonable behavioural assumption during the
transition. We tried various simulations with di¤erent myopic expectations. These showed
very similar initial transition dynamics. These are available on request.

































































* series depicted on right hand scale






























































The transition is characterized by a large decline in output, sustained
over several periods. The decline in output in the …rst period is about 40%,
which is partly due to the reduction in RC and partly due to labor used in
creative destruction. There is a recovery after this initial output fall, due
to the fact that less labor is used in creative destruction. After 5 periods
another fall, caused by the further collapse of the RC network, leads to
a cumulative output decline of 50%. As the stock of RC falls and …rms
have made large technological advances, …rms get an incentive to reduce the
amount of creative destruction they engage in and invest in extra contacts.
18This stabilizes the total amount of RC in the whole economy and starts the
recovery after 7 periods. After about 25 periods, the technological level is
the same as under capitalism, after which the economy grows on average
at the same rate as the technological frontier. The economy returns to the
initial output level after 30 periods. These …gures qualitatively mimic the
real patterns of output ‡uctuation given in Figure 1.
These simulations also predict speci…c changes in factor prices which can
be empirically observed. The RC collapse due to excessive creative destruc-
tion in the …rst 7 periods is accompanied by areduction in the marginal value
of other production factors, i.e. labor and capital. The returns to labor and
capital indeed dropped early in the transition, as is discussed below.
An indirect implicationis about theprice ofcertaintypes oflabour. In the
…rst period of transition, capitalism inherits a large network and backward
technology. Maximizing …rms have an incentive to upgrade their technology
via high Drc
t : The lifting of barriers to creative destruction leads to high
demand for labor involvedin networking, i.e. LRC
t : Suchanimmediate change
has indeed been documented for Slovenia (Orazem and Vodopivec 1997),
Russia (Brainerd, 1998) the Czech Republic (Flanagan, 1998) and China
(Lee, 1999). These demonstrate that the returns to ‘managerial skills’ rose
quickly and immediately after the start of transition.
4.3 The Optimal Transition
To address the question of what the optimal policy could achieve, we analyze
a benchmark case in which an imaginary ‘super-planner’ decides everything
(including Drc
t ). This super-planner maximizes discounted output taking all
externalities into account.
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In Figure 4a, the super-planner chooses Drc
t such that there is an initial
output fall of about 25%. The initial level of creative destruction is about
30% of that of the decentralized transition. The economy recovers to its old
level after 10 periods, with a high growth level recorded in the early years.
Growth in this period is fuelled by growth in the technology used. As in
the earlier simulation, output growth eventually tails o¤ to the level of the
exogenous progress of the technological frontier.
The interesting question is how any realistic policy can mimic the super-
planner solution. The dilemma is that in practice no planner can engage in
creative destruction since this requires decentralized information; but decen-
tralized creative destruction overshoots, as shown in the previous subsection.
20One would like to prevent the massive destruction of contacts that would
ensue if all …rms were able to decide their investments for themselves. An
obvious way would be to restrict the actions of a sizeable proportion of the
…rms in the economy, allowing only a fraction to engage in creative destruc-
tion.
Restricting creative destruction in some …rms but not others requires
restrictions on labor and capital as well. This is because the pro…ts of un-
restricted …rms are necessarily higher than that of restricted ones. The un-
restricted …rms would thus immediately take over the rest of the economy,
leading to an unrestricted transition. Combining laissez-faire policies on a
fraction of…rms whilst maintaining some restrictions on the mobility of labor
and capital, is what China seems to have done.
4.4 Alternative Speci…cations and Extensions
The simulations above showed that our simple model is capable of simulta-
neously capturing economic dynamics under socialism and during the tran-
sition. To examine robustness, we varied the main parameters of the model
above.10 Ineach simulation however, thesocialist erais characterizedby high
initial growth and eventual stagnation. Also in each case, the ’super planner’
outcome shows an initial period of output decrease followedby sharp growth.
We did not …nd a reasonable parameter set under which there was no initial
output collapse in the decentralized transition.
As a means to examine the range of alternative phenomena that can arise
under our model, we below showsimulations with changes inkey parameters.
4.4.1 Downward Spirals: Diamond’s Thick-Market Externality
We …rst endogenize the contact rate ‚t to allow for network externalities.
This is a way in which lock-in e¤ects can appear. Negative lock-in e¤ects
10We searched amongst the grid de…ned by ￿0 2 f0:5;0:65;0:8g; ￿ 2 f0:6;0:7g;
g0 2 f0:2;0:5;1g; g1 2 f0:5;1:5;4g; ‚(:) 2 f0:2;0:4;0:8g; ﬂ = f1;5g; y(:) 2 fCobb-
Douglas,CESg :
21of the initial output fall can prevent technological catch-up and leads to
downward spirals.
In a seminal paper, Diamond (1982) argued that the arrival rate of con-
tacts in search economies is likely to be linked to the number of units in
the market; the more buyers and sellers in a market, the more likely one is
to …nd someone to match with. Such a thick-market externality, which can
also be termed a networking externality, also appears in Howitt and McAfee
(1992). The argument carries over to relational capital build-up in transition
economies. If the contact rate depends positively on the stock of relational
capital in the economy, then the initial decrease in the stock of relational
capital at the start of the transition can lead to further reductions in contact
rates.
The importance of quality institutions in market economies leads to a
similar argument. Heterogeneity in the quality of …rms (such as their credit-
worthiness ortheir reliability) invites free-ridingbehavior of low-quality …rms
on the existence of high-quality suppliers or clients, similar to the Akerlof
(1970) lemons mechanism. Market solutions to both problems include clubs
whichconcentratemorehomogeneous agents. Othersolutionsinclude quality-
control institutions (e.g. banks) which use increasing returns to screening to
reduce information problems. Such market based organizations have set-
up costs and therefore will not appear until the market is su¢ciently large.
This causes ‚ to increase with RC. Hence, in the presence of a thick-market
externality the economy may get stuck in a low-growth trap.
To simulate this possibility, we endogenize ‚t by the function ‚t = ‚0(1¡
e¡‚1RCt¡1¡‚2) with ‚0 = 2; ‚1 = 0:8, and ‚2 = 0:1.11 Hence, ‚t increases in
RC at a decreasing marginal rate. In Appendix 1 we provide a micro-basis
for this speci…cation. Figure 5 shows the transition path.
11Including ‚2 means we have a positive lower bound on ‚t.
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The simulations con…rm our intuitive reasoning. Under socialism, rapid
initial growth can be obtained by increasing the total stock of relational cap-
23ital (Figure 5a). Because of the feedback-e¤ect of this increase in RC on the
contact rate, the expansion takes longer totail o¤. The ’super-planner’ would
againlimit creative destruction duringa transition andmaintaingrowthrates
inde…nitely (Figure 5c). An unrestricted transition would however lead to
a collapse in relational capital, leading to stagnation despite large initial
increases in the technology used. The collapse in relational capital is not
reversed within any reasonable time-frame because of the lock-in e¤ects of
this collapse on contact rates (Figure 5b).
This illustrates that in case Diamond’s thick market externality is impor-
tant, both further technological progress and economic growth may be very
slow to appear after the initial output collapse. Thick-market externalities
are probably not very important in economies with many social networks
(civil society) that provide ways of making contacts independent of existing
contacts. Ineconomies withfewsocial networks, where the existing economic
network may be the only way to make newcontacts, such thick-market exter-
nalities may be much more important. We will return tothe relationbetween
networks and growth in the discussion.
4.4.2 Recovery Time and Smoothness of Transition Paths
The robustness question we look at is the length and smoothness of the
recovery. We introduce two deviations from the simulations above. First
we choose a lower ﬂ which leads to a lower drop in RC and hence to faster
recovery. Second we specify the function g(:) to be less sensitive. Assuming
this function to be less sensitive leads to more variation over time in both Dt
and Nt and hence to di¤erent transition paths. For the simulations in Figure
5, we assume g(D) = (1¡ e¡0:25D); ‚t = 0:6(1¡ e¡0:8RCt¡1), ﬂ = 1:
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25Thesocialist expansion is now similar tothat ofthe main simulation. The
initial output drop during the transition is smaller and the recovery quicker.
The transition paths are not only shorter; they are also less smooth. The
’optimal’ super-planner transition is characterized by growth cycles: periods
of high Dt; low Nt; and low growth, alternate with periods of low Dt; high
Nt; and high growth.
We see erratic business cycles some 15 periods after the start of the de-
centralized transition. The cycles are not unique and are self-ful…lling expec-
tations. They emerge because it is unpro…table to invest in extra contacts
when other …rms are destroying old contacts: the expected life of an extra
contact is higher in periods with low creative destruction. This leads …rms
to coordinate their Dt and their Nt: The resulting cycles resemble the Key-
nesian demand-side variety in the sense that there is a di¤erence between
produced and sold output.
Consider what a depression would look like according to our model. In a
depression, Dt turns out to be high, implying that …rms have few contacts.
This means that …rms cannot sell their output: they simply lack the clients.
The reason why it is not optimal to search for newclients is precisely because
Dt is high: clients can be expected to be gone quickly. In this situation, …rms
replace their trading partners in order to improve productivity. After some
time, there is little scope for further technological improvements, which leads
…rms to expand their numbers of clients and suppliers again. This signals
the end of the depression and is the point in time when sold output growth
is highest. The emergence of these business cycles under capitalism will be
studied further in future work.
In conclusion, the model can accommodate a wide range of transition and
capitalist growth paths. The output collapse appears in all our simulations
however. Thus our approach includes the one feature that all transition
economies have in common.
265 Discussion: Evidence and Policy Issues
5.1 The fall in RC and the Transition Experience
We here want to substantiate the empirical plausibility of the fall in RC
during the transition. In our model, the fall in RC is due to the retraction
of o¢cial control mechanisms and technological catch-up.12 Other phenom-
ena that may have aggravated this collapse of relational capital include the
following (see Gross and Steinherr, 1995; Ellman 1997; Aslund, 2002).
First, there is ample evidence that directly after the start of transition,
bureaucrats and managers cashed in on their control over …rms by asset
stripping (see e.g. Cull et al, 2002). This e¤ectively separated production
factors from relational capital, implying an exogenous drop in RC.
Second, the collapse of the CMEA trade area that spanned the socialist
block, led to a decrease in intra-regional trade. For some countries in Central
Europe this lost trade volume was replaced by trade with the West; for
most it was not. Another reason for reduced trade is that local governments
implemented policies which e¤ectively created barriers to trade by requiring
pre-payments in national banks, payment of high tari¤s at (sometimes new)
borders, etc. These policies were rife at the beginning of the transition, and
continue to be so in Russia and other former USSR states (see Tikhomirov,
2000, for Russia). This can be interpreted as a direct destruction of RC.
The drop in RC at the start of the transition has several implications not
yet discussed, which are among the stylized facts of the transition.





drop. This means wages drop and returns to capital drop. This, in turn,
causes reduced investments into and ‡ight of physical, …nancial and human
capital, for which there is ample evidence (Gros and Steinherr 1995; and
12We found no empirical work on the actual extent of technological catch-up in transition
countries. It is the case thought that the transition countries are major importers of mod-
ern computers and communication equipment, which is a direct indication of technological
catch-up in some areas at least.
27Aslund 2002).
Second, if the costs of building local contacts are greater for foreigners
because they lack RC, one would not expect foreign investments to be in
the form of new physical capital. Indeed, foreign investment mostly took the
form of buying stocks and …nancing ongoing enterprises.
Third, less relational capital implies that people and organizations move
into activities that require fewer contacts: organizations become less special-
ized. Complex production and sale processes will then be the …rst victims
of transition. This process was aptly termed ’primitivization’ by Hedlund
and Sundstrom (1996), commenting on the Russian economy. This included
an increase in bartering, home production, and the ‘Kiosk economy’, observ-
able throughout the former Soviet Union (Seabright, 2000). In the extreme,
persons and households may retreat into near-autarky by producing their
own food - as many households in Russia have indeed done (Caskie, 2000;
Bezemer, 2002)
5.2 Policy Issues
The present study would lead to very similar recommendations on the de-
sign of the transition as those advocated by Roland (2002): having a dual
track approach allows the emergence of a capitalist sector where creative de-
struction provides high growth and the development of a network, whilst the
e¤ective freezing of relations within the state sector prevents a large output
collapse.
The second major policy issue is enterprise governance. Our analysis
suggests the merits of insider privatization: if the de facto possessors of
enterprise RC are not made its o¢cial owners, the enterprise as an entity
su¤ers a loss in RC. The insiders either move out of the organization, directly
givinguptheir RC, or they feel forcedto sell o¤ the assets illegally, whichalso
amounts to a separation of other production factors from RC. This principal-
agent aspect ofinsider control was also putforwardby BlanchardandAghion
(1996), who made the point that insiders could sell o¤ the enterprise if they
28would truly not be best placed to lead them.
There is some empirical work on this issue. Moers (2000) analyses a large
survey of Russian …rms in the 1992-1999 period and concludes that those
…rms that experienced outsider takeover via voucher schemes fared much
worse than …rms under continued management. Walsh and Whelan (2001)
surveyed …rms in Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, and conclude
that those …rms that did best were those that resisted outsider takeover.
Whilst alternative explanations for the …ndings of both studies are possible,
they do give tacit support for the argument that insider takeover preserves
RC and thereby fosters enterprise pro…tability.
The Chinese experience suggests the bene…t of a dual track approach
(Tian, 1999) and of insider takeover: in China, most ‘new’ companies are
run by local party members who often obtained the means of production of
local state companies (Lin, 2001). Lee (1999) …nds that these companies
have very high growth rates.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce the notion of relational capital to capture the
importance of contacts. Contacts, as a form of information, are an input into
sold output in our model. This follows the suggestion by Stiglitz (1995) and
others that information should be viewed as a separate factor of production.
We argue that undercapitalism, the destructionofsomecontacts insearch
for better ones is an integral part of technological advancement. Socialist
economies restricted such creative destruction, which we argue lead to their
increasing technological backwardness.
In our explanation, the output fall during an unrestricted transition was
inevitable: technological catch-up implied high levels of destroyed and re-
placed relational capital. This not only had high direct opportunity costs
(more labor is used for the production of relational capital) but also led to
a loss in overall relational capital, since there is a negative externality of
29creative destruction.
Our model leads to support for dual track approaches and insider take-
over. Dual track approaches avoid some of the negative externalities. Insider
take-over prevents exogenous loss of RC.
It seems very likely that changes in RC are linked to and have conse-
quences for other networks. One can for instance argue that criminal net-
works serve as a substitute for networks in the formal economy. The fall in
RC in the o¢cial sector then leads to criminalization of the economy because
the criminal network survived the collapse of o¢cial RC. This is consistent
withthe initial, andin many cases not reversed, riseinorganizedcrime every-
where inEastern Europe (see Braguinsky and Yavlinsky, 2000; and Ledeneva
and Kurkchiyan, 2000).
Complementarities between formal and informal networks may also be
important. Sobel (2002) reviews the argument that social networks in gen-
eral facilitate coordination between economic agents because of information
transfers within the network. This is an argument for a positive relation
between ‘civil society’ and ‚; where a higher ‚ leads to quicker technology
adoption and network build-up: This is one explanation for why those coun-
tries with more developed civil societies, i.e. Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary, experienced quicker recoveries. In Frijters et al. (2003) we use a
related model to discuss the relation between the concepts of social capital
and our concept of relational capital.
An interesting direction for future theoretical work is the interaction be-
tween politics and relational capital. In this respect, Dulleck and Frijters
(2003) argue that the crux of many development problems lies in the reluc-
tance of those currently in power to allow growth of the relational capital
of others because the growth of a rival network would lead to shifts in the
balance of power.
The article gives rise to several empirical questions. Measuring the stock
of contacts in an economy, and labor devoted to their creation, is obviously
the …rst task. In the spirit of Porat (1997) and Machlup (1962), who pi-
30oneered the empirics of information processing in the economy, one could
attempt to count the number of employees involved in the various infor-
mation gathering tasks. Another approach is to directly survey managers
about how often they replace contacts or are being replaced themselves, and
whether they add contacts to their ‘stock’. While de…ning and recording
contacts may prove challenging and time-consuming, there is no conceptual
reason why collecting such data would be impossible.
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36Appendix 1: A search model of relational capital.
In this appendix we motivate the macro-model of creative destruction by
a micro-search model. We will borrow arguments from the search literature
by exploiting the analogy with the matching process of vacancies and job-
seekers (Pissarides, 1990 and Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001).
Denote the number of contacts a representative individual …rm i has by
Ci. Denote the number of extra contacts a …rm makes by Ni and the number
of contacts it replaces by Di: Take the number of …rms M to be large, such
that the proportion of contacts any …rms has is approximately zero. When
…rm i replaces an old contact with a newone, it loses a previous contact. The
…rm j with whom …rm i makes a replacement contact also loses a previous
contact. Hence both …rm i and j remain with the same number of contacts
as before. The externality is that the two …rms that i and j were previously
connected to, lose a contact. If these former contacts were both necessary
links, each in a network of k contacts, the net loss of contacts is ﬂ = 2k¡ 1.
The number of existing, new, and destroyedcontacts is assumed large enough
to be able to abstract from indivisibilities.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, …rms seek extra
contacts and replacement contacts. Then, these latent contacts materialize,
after which production takes place. Finally, the technology to be used next
period is updated.
Assume …rst that only one contact in the economy is severed, then the
probability that one speci…c contact is a¤ected is equal to
1 P
iCi. Firm i
is a¤ected by creative destruction by all other …rms j 6= i in the economy,
directly or indirectly. Hence, the probability of any contact surviving the




j6=iﬂDj which is in the
limit of a large M equal to e¡ﬂ
¹ D
¹ C: The number of contacts of …rm i after
creative destruction and extra contacts is thereby equal to Ci ¤ e¡ﬂ
¹ D
¹ C + Ni:
Adding time subscripts and re-labelling, this is the same as the formula for
RCt given in the main text. Note that here the replacement contacts are
treated as cumulative, i.e. it is possible to replace the same initial contact
37several times in one period, leading to a larger technological improvement.
In contrast, extra contacts are additive.
We cansimilarly give amicro-foundationfor‚(:); i.e. the relationbetween
labor invested into making newcontacts, the number of old contacts and the
number of new (extra and replacement) contacts. We exploit the analogy
withjobsearchandenvisage theprocess of …ndingcontacts as follows: denote
the amount of labor …rm i allocates towards creating extra contacts by LN;i
and the amount allocated towards replacing contacts by LD;i: This labor is
directly and linearly transformed into ‘active contact vacancies’ whereby the
old contacts involved in replacements are only actually destroyed if a partner
for the replacement contact is found. We can hence also use (LN;i+LD;i) to
denote the number of contact vacancies …rm i has. We thenhave asymmetric
matching situationwhereby LN;i numberof potential contactsof each…rmget
matched to the
P
j6=iLN;j potential extra contacts of other …rms. The total





j6=iLN;j): As Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) show, there
are several micro-mechanisms via which we can arrive at a linear matching
function, implying that the total number of extra contacts is linear in the
numberof potential extra contacts. One suchpossiblemechanism is thateach
individual latent contact has a …xed probability ‚ of being ‘noticed’, which is
a ‘…xed advertisement space’ assumption. All these ‘noticed’ latent contacts
then get randomly matched to each other. This then indeed would imply a
constant returns to scale matching function and a linear relation between the
amount of labor devoted to making extra and replacement contacts and the
number of new extra and replacement contacts.
We can also endogenize ‚ in a way that links it to the number of contacts
already existing in the economy. A natural possibility is to assume that it is
thetwosides ofan‘old’ contact via which latent contacts getnoticed. Assume
for instance that there is aconstant probability termed ‚0that a latent match
is productive. The probability that a latent contact is observed by an existing
contact is in…nitesimally small and denoted by ‚1. The probability that an
38individual latent contact gets labelled as a‘noticedandproductive’ contact is
then equal to ‚0¤(1¡(1¡‚1)
P
j6=iCj) which converges to ‚0¤(1¡e¡‚1M ¹ C): In
terms of the formulas in the text, this would mean the function ‚(RCt¡1) =
‚0 ¤(1¡ e¡‚1RCt¡1) is a natural candidate which has the standard convexity
properties.
Various other micro-mechanisms leading to such relations also exist how-
ever. The key aspect is that the thick-market externality of Diamond (1982)
is incorporated. In the example above, this thick-market externality is in-
corporated in the assumption that each side of an existing contact has an
independent probability of noticing a latent contact. This is a network ex-
ternality of having many existing contacts.
Finally, we can think of the following stylized micro-foundation to our
process of technological change. Take each representative …rm to consist of a
…xed number of labor units, say Z units. The technology used by eachlabour
unit i dependson one contact (eg. the machine provider or the service depart-
ment of another …rm). Di¤erent units in the same …rm may or may not use
the same contact as the technology source. Each labour unit i then combines
the other contacts and capital toproduce sold output. Economies of scale en-
sure that at the …rm level yt increases with RCt. Now, the technology of the
matchbetweenunit i andher contact is on averageAt¡1. The …rm can search
for more contacts (Nt) and/or to …nd di¤erent technology contacts (Dt). If a
unit i changes atechnology contact, her previous technology contact becomes
redundant because economiesof scale in doing any speci…c task make thepro-
ductivity of unit i highest when working only with one technology contact
(eg. using one word processing program is more e¢cient that working with
two simultaneously). The …rm observes two equally sized sets of candidate
contacts it cansearchfrom, one forDt and one for Nt. The equal size assump-
tion means the symmetry assumed in the matching stories above between Dt
and Nt remains valid, and the previous matching arguments go though after
appropriate normalisation. The distribution of technical productivity of po-
tential ‘di¤erent’ contacts is in continuous ‡ux: every period, the productiv-
39ity that unit i would have with a di¤erent technology contact j is drawn from
a c.d.f. Ht(:), where Ht(At¡1)=0 and Ht(At¡1 + ga(A¤
t¡1 ¡ At¡1))=1. This
means a…rm canobserve ‘a regionof potential better matches’ that lie within
a fraction ga between the productivity of a current match and the technolog-
ical frontier. One can think of Ht(:) as the result of an exogenous, random,
and continuous learning process that other potential matches undergo whilst
they are inactive. The expected technical productivity of the ‘di¤erent’ tech-





of …nding a di¤erent set of matches starting from the current (potentially
latent) technology can be repeated many times in the same period until the
eventual set of contacts is …nally e¤ectuated and the old ones are severed.
If g0 is small, then the expected result of one period of technological change
goes to At¡1 + (1 ¡ e¡g0)(A¤
t¡1 ¡ At¡1) where g0 = •tE[
Ht(:)¡At¡1
A¤
t¡1¡At¡1] and •t is
the number of ‘rounds of innovation’ per labour unit in the period. When
•t is reasonably small, the probability of any contact surviving the contact
destruction by other …rms will approach e¡ﬂ
¹ D
¹ C:
If we add an exogenous probability (1¡ g1) that the …rm is completely
mistaken about each unit’s set of potential new technology contacts (where
the mistake is revealed only after all rounds of innovation), and relate •t to
Dt, then we get the technological progress function speci…ed in the simula-
tions.
Appendix 2: Steady states.
(i) socialism
In the steady state under socialism there is no creative destruction: Drc
t
equals 0. This means there will be no growth in the steady states, and Nrc
t
will equal zero. The solutions to the …rst-order conditions in the steady state















The …rst two equations yield wages and rental prices of capital, whereas
the third equation solves the steady state level of RC at which further accu-
mulation of relational capital is worth precisely the opportunity cost of labor
and hence the point at which relational capital accumulation stops. Unique-
ness of this solution follows from the convexity of y (and ‚) with respect to
the equilibrium level of RC.
(ii) steady state capitalism
We de…ne the (symmetric) steady state under capitalism as the …xed
level of D¤ and N¤ at which no individual …rm can make a further pro…t
by changing Dt and/or Nt: The steady state under capitalism has long term
technological progress equalling the rate of progress in the technological fron-
tier when D¤ = N¤ > 0:
We again denote by ¤, the solutions to the …rst order conditions in the











Note, this determines also the marginal product of Lrc
t , because labor
musthavethe sameproductivity for bothphysical production andcontacting.




ﬁ+g(D¤) = 1 ¡
ﬁ
ﬁ+g(D¤); which implies @At
@Ds = (1 ¡ g(D¤))t¡s¡1A¤
tg0(D¤)ﬁ
ﬁ+g(D¤) for any s < t. We
presume the steady state to start at time T: this implies that wages in period
41t are given as wt = (1+ﬁ)t¡TwT; interest as rt = r¤; and At = (1+ﬁ)t¡TAT.























Given that the marginal productivity of Lrc is determined by the wage
solution, equation (8) solves for the level of D¤ given that marginal produc-
tivity must again equal the wage cost of D. Because maximization is done
on the individual …rm level, the cost an individual …rm uses does not include
the externality of D¤ on the level of RC of others. Equation (9) solves for the
optimal RC¤ given the equilibrium level of D¤ and thereby determines N¤
by equating the discounted bene…ts of extra RCt to the wage costs. Because
of the convexities in g(:), and y(:); existence of equilibrium is assured. We
make no claim about the stability of the economy at or close to this steady
state, or indeed *about the uniqueness of the transition paths.
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